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Abstract: In this paper, it is argued that Lord Jim provides verisimilitude in relation 
to the law and practice of contemporary inquiries and investigations into marine casualties; 
and that the novel is a case study for academic and practising admiralty lawyers: illustrating 
the use and abuse of the law and procedures of Courts of Inquiry; exposing violations of the 
obligations owed by master and officers to their passengers; questioning notions of fair 
punishment; and suggesting drafting options for the enactment of statutes encouraging 
cooperation between seafarers and casualty investigators.  The interpretation of such 
enactments should, it is argued, be adapted to the characteristics of the enactments, their 
interpreters, and their interpretive community at the International Maritime Organization of 
the United Nations. 
1. Introduction 
Lord Jim fuses imaginative and technical language, reflecting the use and abuse of actual court 
procedures, laws and penalties.  This legal reading of the great novel, a contribution to the vast body of 
multidisciplinary scholarship around the work, argues for its greater prominence in law and literature2 and 
merges the hermeneutics of law and literature, reconciling their often antithetical tendencies. Can the 
densely adjectival and powerful imaginative language of deliberate ambivalence and sometimes 
bewildering complexity3 in Lord Jim be fused with the concise technical language of precise legal 
meaning that awaits identification in the novel?  Conrad answers in The Mirror of the Sea,  
 
                                                 
1
 I am indebted to Dr Stephanie Jones for her comments on an earlier version of this paper and to Sir Anthony Evans, 
now retired from the Court of Appeal, for a discussion about the relationship between law and literature.  To Karolina 
Kodrzycka (a native Polish speaker), who assiduously tracked down elusive documents, I extend my thanks.   I would 
also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their encouragement, criticisms and suggestions. All references to 
Lord Jim, the Mirror of the Sea, A Personal Record and Typhoon are based on the Project Gutenberg EBook of Lord 
Jim release date: January 9, 2006 [EBook #5658]; the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Mirror of the Sea, release 
date: October, 1997  [EBook #1058]; the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Personal Record, release date: January 9, 
2006 [EBook #687]; and the AD. Donker publication of Heart of Darkness and Typhoon of 1987.   
2
 For an excellent account of the current status of law and literature,  see Bard, Jennifer; Mayo, Thomas W.; and 
Tovino, Stacy A., `Three Ways of Looking at a Health Law and Literature Class` (2009) Scholarly Works, Paper 75 
at pp. 512-572. 
3
 Tadie, Alexis `Perceptions of Language in Lord Jim` (2006) Conradian vol. 31 issue 1 at p. 16. As to Jim’s 
`uncertain positioning between language and silence` see Hannah, Daniel `Under a cloud: Silence, Identity, and 
Interpretation in Lord Jim` (2008) Conradiana vol. 40 at p. 39. In regard to `the extent to which Conrad is 
consciously dramatizing the very inadequacy of language` see Ray, Martin `Conrad, Schopenhauer, and le mot juste 
(2008) Conradiana vol. 33 at p. 31.  As to the much quoted `adjectival insistence` of Conrad’s writing, see Leavis, F. 
R. (1948) reprinted 1976 The Great Tradition Pelican Books at pp. 204 –5.  With regard to the `bewildering 
complexity` of the language, see Miller, J. Hillis `Lord Jim: Repetition as Subversion of Organic Form` reprinted in 
(1996) Joseph Conrad Lord Jim London: W.W. Norton & Company at p. 446.  As to the `duplicity of language` in 
Lord Jim see, Said, Edward `The Presentation of Narrative in Lord Jim` reprinted in (1996) Joseph Conrad Lord Jim 
London: W.W. Norton & Company at p. 454 and words conveying and concealing meaning, see Weinstein, Philip M. 
`Nothing Can Touch Me: Lord Jim`` reprinted in (1996) Joseph Conrad Lord Jim London: W.W. Norton & Company 
at p. 458-469.  
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Your journalist whether he takes charge of a ship or a fleet, almost invariably ‘casts’ his 
anchor.  Now, an anchor is never cast, and to take a liberty with technical language is a 
crime against the clearness, precision, and beauty of perfected speech … technical 
language is an instrument wrought into perfection … the growth of the cable – [is one 
example of] a sailor’s phrase which has all the force, precision, and imagery of 
technical language … [and a second example] we’ll take that foresail off her and put 
her head under her wing for the night  … in imaginative precision … is one of the most 
expressive sentences I have ever heard on human lips (pp. 13-14).  
 
This legal reading of the novel begins with the identification of its technical legal language of 
imaginative precision.  Conrad, it will be shown, had an intimate knowledge of the law and procedure of a 
Court of Inquiry, arguably derived from his professional training, general awareness of legal proceedings, 
and especially his own appearances before such courts, on one occasion narrowly but fairly escaping 
cancellation of his certificate of competency.  Kieran Dolin’s observation that Jim is ‘not convicted of a 
crime in the technical sense’ since he appears before a ‘marine court’4 (which presumably means a Court 
of Inquiry) is demonstrably correct. Kieran Dolin’s persuasive study of Jim’s claim to ‘sympathetic 
interest’ depends on the fact that ‘unlike his skipper he did not attempt to evade the justice of the 
community.’ 5  Jim’s treatment by the Court was however arguably irregular and unjust, further enhancing 
our sympathy for him.  And when Jim’s voluntarily appearance before the Court is contrasted with the 
fugitive legal status of the master and other officers, it will be contended that Lord Jim provides legal 
drafters with a case study for the domestic enactment of international law better calibrated to achieve 
cooperation between seafarers and casualty investigators, the prevention of marine casualties, and justice 
for seafarers.  Finally, it will be argued that the interpretation of such enactments requires a special 
approach, adapted to the unique characteristics of the enactments, of the interpreters, and of the 
interpretive community.    
2. Court of Inquiry in Lord Jim  
The word `inquiry,` shorn of dense adjectives, is used 23 times, with consistent clarity throughout the 
novel. One reference is to the `Court of Inquiry,` which was an actual and very active court. This court 
was established in 1876.  It has since decided many thousands of cases,6 which must have had a profound 
effect in saving life and property at sea.  The Court is still important for safety of life at sea today.  The 
word `inquiry,` being employed in 20 other instances in the novel, refers consistently to a Court of 
Inquiry.  
The establishment of the Court of Inquiry can be traced to the resolutions of a Select Committee of 
the House of Commons in 1836.7   The Court was and is unique: it has its own statutorily defined 
jurisdiction, procedure and law.  It proceeds in open court, employing a combination of inquisitorial and 
adversarial procedures when inquiring into marine casualties;8 although the standard of proof it applies, 
either on a balance of probability or beyond a reasonable doubt, is unclear.   
At the time Lord Jim was penned, the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 was in force. By virtue 
of s. 478(1), the Act applied to British possessions. The legislature of any British possession was 
empowered to authorise any court to `make enquiries as to … charges of incompetency or misconduct … 
when the master, mate or engineer of a British ship who is charged with incompetency or with 
misconduct on board that British ship is found in the British possession.`  Given the great extent of British 
                                                 
4
 Kieran Dolin Fiction and the Law Legal Discourse in Victorian and Modernist Literature (1999 Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press) pp. 148-149. 
5
 Kieran Dolin Fiction and the Law Legal Discourse in Victorian and Modernist Literature (1999 Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press) pp. 148-149. 
 
6
 McMillan A.R.G. (1929) Shipping Inquiries and Courts as Regulated by the Merchant Shipping Act  London: 
Stevens and Sons at p. v. 
7
 Sir Walter Murton (1884) Wreck inquiries: The Law and Practice Relating to Formal Investigations in the United 
Kingdom, British Possessions and Before Naval Courts into Shipping Casualties and the Incompetency and 
Misconduct of Ships’ Officers With an Introduction London: Stevens and Sons at p 1. 
8
 Sir Walter Murton (1884) Wreck inquiries: The Law and Practice Relating to Formal Investigations in the United 
Kingdom, British Possessions and Before Naval Courts into Shipping Casualties and the Incompetency and 
Misconduct of Ships’ Officers With an Introduction London: Stevens and Sons at p 5.  
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possessions, it comes as no surprise that Jim should appearance before a British Court of Inquiry in an 
Eastern port. 
3. Questions Before the Court  
Marlow says that there were,  
 
several questions before the court. The first as to whether the ship was in every respect 
fit and seaworthy for the voyage. The court found she was not. The next point, I 
remember, was, whether up to the time of the accident the ship had been navigated with 
proper and seamanlike care. They said Yes to that, goodness knows why, and then they 
declared that there was no evidence to show the exact cause of the accident (p. 73).  
 
The significance of the `questions` is very easily overlooked, since the unique features of the Court9 
were, and are, little known, even to many lawyers. The `questions` were specific to the circumstances of 
the casualty, formulated by the Board of Trade, and submitted by the Board to the Court.10 This was 
considered appropriate, since the Board undertook `the superintendence of all matters relating to 
merchant shipping and seamen.`11 The Shipping Casualty Rules12 read together with s. 479 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 obligated the Board to, `shall state in open court upon what questions in 
reference to the causes of the casualty, and the conduct of persons connected therewith, they desire the 
opinion of the court.`13   
The phrase `several questions before the court` in Lord Jim is therefore a precise reference to the 
questions that would have been submitted by the Board to the Court and not a loosely textured phrase 
broadly connoting the usual questions that may be expected of any other - and much more usual - court 
procedure. Given that the Board employed no standard questions (their formulation being virtually 
limitless since they were linked to the facts of each case), the particular question in Lord Jim, whether the 
ship had `been navigated with proper and seamanlike care`, is most remarkable, since the extant records 
show it to have been a verbatim question submitted by the Board to an actual Court.14  
The course of legal proceedings in a Court of Inquiry is fundamentally determined by the questions 
put to the Court. The central legal question goes to the abandonment of the Patna.  Not to ask that 
question would be inexcusable, suggesting a cover-up, an attempt to divert attention from the central 
question.  But the central question might itself have been variously phrased.  ‘Did the master conduct a 
proper abandonment of the Patna?’ would have been an appropriate question given the master’s legal 
obligations.  Had that been the question, no finding could have been made against Jim, his certificate 
would have been safe from cancellation.  ‘Did the master and officers conduct a proper abandonment the 
Patna?’ is a question that would have obviously implicated all the officers.  Phrasing the central question 
is therefore of crucial importance, being determined with reference to the facts of common notoriety, 
which facts would obviously not yet have been legally established in Court.  It is therefore understandable 
that the central question may not always be sufficiently closely related to the cause of a casualty; or it 
may unfairly implicate particular seafarers, putting them to their own defence; or it may require 
clarification, especially by way of secondary questions.  For such reasons, an ‘inquiry’ may ironically 
widen rather than narrow the search for the truth.  It is therefore an apt metaphor of imaginative precision, 
                                                 
9
 McMillan A.R.G. (1929) Shipping Inquiries and Courts as Regulated by the Merchant Shipping Act London: 
Stevens and Sons at p. 1.  
10
 Sir Walter Murton (1884) Wreck inquiries: The Law and Practice Relating to Formal Investigations in the United 
Kingdom, British Possessions and Before Naval Courts into Shipping Casualties and the Incompetency and 
Misconduct of Ships’ Officers With an Introduction London: Stevens and Sons at pp. 557-577. 
11
 By virtue of s. 713 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. 
12
 Rule 16 of the Shipping Casualty Rules. 
13
 As to when the questions are stated in Court see: The Carlisle 1906 P.D. 301. 
14
 Sir Walter Murton (1884) Wreck inquiries: The Law and Practice Relating to Formal Investigations in the United 
Kingdom, British Possessions and Before Naval Courts into Shipping Casualties and the Incompetency and 
Misconduct of Ships’ Officers With an Introduction London: Stevens and Sons at p. 570; and at p. 121 as to the need 
for the questions to be in writing so as to afford seafarers an opportunity to defend themselves.  
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evoking the proliferating questions, multiple narratives, and differing answers that run in parallel in Lord 
Jim concerning the illusive character of Jim.     
4. Magistrate and Nautical Assesors  
Marlow says,  
 
The face of the presiding magistrate, clean shaved and impassable, looked at him 
deadly pale between the red faces of the two nautical assessors. The light of a broad 
window under the ceiling fell from above on the heads and shoulders of the three men, 
and they were fiercely distinct in the half-light of the big court-room where the 
audience seemed composed of staring shadows. They wanted facts. Facts! They 
demanded facts from him, as if facts could explain anything! (p. 14). 
 
Again the language is technically exact.  A `magistrate,` among others, could preside over a Court of 
Inquiry.15 The presence of the `nautical assessors` (more technical language derived from the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894),16 means that the Court was empowered to cancel Jim’s certificate, since under s. 
466(3), where the inquiry appeared likely to involve the cancellation of a certificate, the court had to 
`hold the investigation with the assistance of not less than two such assessors,` who would have been 
chosen by the Secretary of State (the Board could not request the appointment of an individual assessor)17 
from the approved list of assessors who themselves possessed the necessary certificates and experience of 
command.18  Today nautical assessors continue to sit on Courts of Inquiry in many jurisdictions around 
the world when cancellation is a possibility.19 
5. Cancellation of Certificate in Public  
Marlow says of Jim in the Court,  
 
He stared with parted lips, hanging upon the words of the man behind the desk. These 
came out into the stillness … I … caught only the fragments of official language . . .  
Gustav So-and-so . . . master . . . native of Germany . . . James So-and-so . . . mate . . . 
certificates cancelled (p. 73).  
 
‘Cancelled’ is an exact technical word.  Section 470(1)(b) of the Merchant Shipping Act 189420 
stipulated that a certificate may have been `cancelled` if the court found the seafarer incompetent or guilty 
of gross misconduct.21  Cancellation is the exact technical term still in use in many jurisdictions today.  
Jim’s certificate was cancelled in open Court in accordance with Merchant Shipping Act 189422 and the 
                                                 
15
 See Rule III of the Rules then in force in Sir Walter Murton (1884) Wreck inquiries: The Law and Practice 
Relating to Formal Investigations in the United Kingdom, British Possessions and Before Naval Courts into Shipping 
Casualties and the Incompetency and Misconduct of Ships’ Officers With an Introduction London: Stevens and Sons, 
at p. 106.  
16
 See s. 466(3) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. 
17
 See the General Rules for Formal Investigations into Shipping Casualties 1895, rule 25. 
18
 See the General Rules for Formal Investigations into Shipping Casualties 1895, rules 22, 23 and 24.  See also 
Pulling, Alexander (1894) The Shipping Code1894 London: Stevens and Sons at p. xxxii.  
19
 In Namibia, for instance, under s. 267 of the 1951 Act, the Court comprises the presiding officer and four assessors, 
although it may sit less than four assessors if, for example, an application for the removal of an assessor is made to 
the Court. In the Court of Marine Enquiry in Namibia in the Matter of the MFV Meob Bay (17 January 2005) a 
successful application was brought to remove an assessor.   
20
 By virtue of s. 478(5) of the 1894 Act, the Court in a British possession would have had the same power to cancel a 
certificate. 
21
 See Hart E. L and Bucknill A. T. (1911) 5 ed.  A Treatise on the Law of Merchant Shipping London: Sweet and 
Maxwell at p. 217. 
22
 By virtue of s. 470(2). 
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General Rules for Formal Investigations into Shipping Casualties 1895.23  This publicity, as will be 
argued, was unwarranted in Jim’s case and the rigidity of the rule should, as a matter of law reform, be 
relaxed in exceptional circumstances.  
In summary, the depiction of the Court in Lord Jim is a remarkably accurate reflection of the unique 
and little known features of an actual Court. So, how did Conrad obtain such detailed legal knowledge?  
Hans van Marle and Pierre Lefrance describe the power of Conrad’s imagination to combine and fuse 
together `identifiable fragments of experience, places, episodes, and people`24 into `rich and varied 
patterns.`25  These identifiable fragments include Conrad’s concern about the dangers of navigation; his 
personal certification ordeals; and his direct experience of actual inquiries.  Paying more attention to these 
fragments opens up new approaches to Lord Jim and the law with particular reference to casualty 
inquiries and investigations.   
6. Conrad and the Law  
Conrad, sailing at a time of much public concern about the dangers of navigation, was alert to inquiries 
and commissions dealing with safety. In A Personal Record, he paid tribute to Captain Froud, who `had 
… organized for us courses of professional lectures … corresponded industriously with public bodies and 
members of Parliament … as to the oncoming of some inquiry or commission relating to matters of the 
sea and to the work of seamen` (p. 11).  On 3 July 1894, Conrad appeared before the Board of Trade’s 
Departmental Committee on the Manning of Merchant Ships and answered 126 questions about the safe 
manning of ships.26  From his answers, he was said to be `proud to have been a professional seaman;`27 
although in relation to his experience in sailing ships, his answers suggested `modesty or perhaps 
insecurity?`28 That Conrad chose to answer questions indicates his abiding interest in safety, which was 
also manifested in `Some Reflections on the loss of the Titanic,`29 although his speculation that the loss 
was caused by the design of the Titanic was not confirmed in the findings of the Court of Inquiry.  
 Conrad had a deep personal interest in the safety of ships at sea. He sailed, either as a passenger or a 
seafarer, intermittently over the period 15 December 1874 to 2 September 1892. Of the 20 ships on which 
Conrad sailed, eight were lost at sea.30     
Conrad’s learning of the law may have begun in the process of his certification as a master, since 
`knowledge of legislation` was, as Bruyns points out, `important for a candidate for master.`31 Conrad 
failed twice in his professional examinations; Jim failed once in the professional discharge of his duties.32 
                                                 
23
 By virtue of rule 15. See also The Kestral 1881 P.D.182 as to further reasons being stated in the Report after the 
court decision. The Corchester 1957 P.D. 84 at p. 89. Even a reprimand was regarded as a serious matter for the 
seafarer: The Royal Star 1928 P.D. 48 at pp. 51, 53.  
24
 van Marle, Hans and Lefranc, Pierre `Ashore and Afloat: New Perspectives on Topography and Geography in Lord 
Jim` (1988) Conradiana vol. 20 no. 2 p. 109 at p. 129. 
25
 van Marle, Hans and Lefranc, Pierre `Ashore and Afloat: New Perspectives on Topography and Geography in Lord 
Jim` (1988) Conradiana vol. 20 no. 2 p. 109 at p. 129. 
26
 For all of Conrad’s answers see: Bojarski, Edmund `Conrad at the Crossroads: From Navigator Novelist with New 
Biographical Mysteries` (1968) Texas Quarterly at pp. 15-29. As to the accuracy of Conrad’s answers, see Bruyns, 
Willem F.J. Morzer `Conrad’s Navigation: Joseph Conrad as a Professional Sailor` (2007) International Journal of 
Maritime History vol. XIX no. 2 p. 201 at pp. 215 - 220. As to Conrad’s service on the Falconhurst, see Bojarski, 
Edmond and Stevens, Harold `Joseph Conrad and the Falconhurst` (1970-1971) Journal of Modern Literature vol. 1 
no. 2 p. 197 at p. 208. 
27
 Bruyns, Willem F.J. Morzer `Conrad’s Navigation: Joseph Conrad as a Professional Sailor` (2007) International 
Journal of Maritime History vol. XIX no. 2 p. 201 at p. 215. 
28Bruyns, Willem F.J. Morzer `Conrad’s Navigation: Joseph Conrad as a Professional Sailor` (2007) International 
Journal of Maritime History vol. XIX no. 2 p. 201  at p. 218.  
29
 As to the `sardonic, almost Swiftian, treatment` of the loss of the Titanic see Wolstenholme, Philip`We are trusted: 
Conrad and the Blue Star Line Crosbie Smith` (2004) The Conradian vol. 29 at p. 39.  
30
 Bojarshi, Edmond A. and Stevens, Harold Ray `Joseph Conrad and the Falconhurst` (1970-1971)  Journal of 
Modern Literature vol. 1 no. 2 197 at p. 208. 
31
 Bruyns, Willem F.J. Morzer `Conrad’s Navigation: Joseph Conrad as a Professional Sailor` (2007) International 
Journal of Maritime History XIX No. 2 p. 201.  As to the past and future training of seafarers see, for example, 
Kennerley, Alston `Writing the History of Merchant Seafarer Education, Training and Welfare: Retrospect and 
Prospect` (2002) The Northern Mariner no. 2 p. 1.    
32
 See the intriguing study of other parallels between Jim and Conrad by Watt, Ian `Composition and Sources` 
reprinted in (1996) Joseph Conrad Lord Jim London: W.W. Norton & Company at p. 426.   
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On 17 November 1884, Conrad failed at his first attempt at the day’s work (a navigation subject) in the 
examination for first mate. But he passed the examination on 3 December 1884; and, on 5 December 
1884, he was awarded a certificate as first mate.  Conrad failed in arithmetic and in the `day’s work` in 
his first attempt at the examination for his masters certificate on 28 July 1886.  But, passing on 11 
November 1886, he was awarded the certificate. ‘It was a fact` said Conrad in A Personal Record, `that I 
was now a British master mariner beyond a doubt.` He appears to have made no written mention of his 
failures33; not in his letters to his uncle Tadeusz Bobrowski; not in the The Mirror of the Sea; and not in A 
Personal Record.  He said in the preface that `the immediate aim` of A Personal Record `is to give the 
record of personal memories by presenting faithfully the feelings and sensations connected with the 
writing of my first book and with my first contact with the sea.`  This is not, as has been suggested, a 
promise of a full and frank confession. In A Personal Record, Conrad wrote of his `fate` in being 
delivered into the hands of his three examiners. Of his examination for second mate, he said, `I was not 
frightened of being plucked; that eventuality did not even present itself to my mind` (p. 74); nor did he 
fail, on that occasion. The failures were to follow, which may explain why he spoke in A Personal Record 
of the `ordeal` in respect of his examination for first mate. He added however that his examiner remarked, 
`You've done very well`, although this would have been said in the context of his second and successful 
attempt. Having passed, he `walked on air along Tower Hill, where so many good men had lost their 
heads because, I suppose, they were not resourceful enough to save them.` (p. 77) Given Conrad’s 
examination ordeals, he must have been sensitised to failure; and the need for a second chance. A Court 
of Inquiry is, in essence, an inquiry into failure; and - if appropriate - it, too, should allow for a second 
chance; a chance, it will be argued, that Jim deserved - both ethically and legally - but which the Court 
denied.      
7. Conrad and Courts of Inquiry  
The widely held view that Lord Jim was primarily34 based on the abandonment of the Jeddah is helpful; 
but the distinctions with the novel are more important.  In August 1880 and when in London, Conrad 
heard about the uproar concerning the Jeddah, which involved a ship’s officer only five years older than 
Conrad.  When in Sydney in late 1880, he `heard it endlessly debated during his seven weeks in the 
port.`35  He read about it again in Newcastle in autumn 1881.36  But, as Wolstenholme has remarked, the 
parallels with the Jeddah are `significantly and deliberately inexact.`37  Two legal distinctions are 
significant: first, the Court of Inquiry found Captain Clark of the Jeddah `guilty of gross misconduct in 
being indirectly the cause of the deaths` of 21 persons; but no life was lost from the Patna. Second, 
Clark’s certificate was suspended for three years; but Jim’s certificate was cancelled. Those distinctions 
suggest that Conrad may well have intended the cancellation of Jim’s certificate to be viewed as unfairly 
harsh, an argument that will later be further developed.      
Conrad’s first personal experience of an Inquiry arose in respect of the Palestine.  On 17 September 
1882, he sailed as second mate38 on a vessel, which was lost.  The Inquiry was held at the Police Court in 
Singapore on 2 April 1883. The President Senior Magistrate presided over the Court, assisted by two 
nautical assessors, indicating that the cancellation of certificates must have been foreseen as a possibility.  
The Court record reveals that a fire broke out in the cargo of coal. On 14 March, the decks blew up, fore 
and aft. The boats were provisioned, and the Palestine headed for the Sumatra shore.  The SS Somerset 
                                                 
33
 As to the possible reasons for Conrad’s failures, see Bruyns, Willem F.J. Morzer `Conrad’s Navigation: Joseph 
Conrad as a Professional Sailor` (2007) International Journal of Maritime History vol. XIX no. 2 p. 201 at p. 209. 
34
 See the excellent research of van Marle, Hans and Lefranc, Pierre `Ashore and Afloat: New Perspectives on 
Topography and Geography in Lord Jim` (1988) Conradiana vol. 20 no. 2 p. 109 at pp. 116, 123 in respect of the 
Patna being primarily based on the Jeddah, the place of the Patna inquiry, and the route of the Patna voyage, the 
place of the abandonment of the Patna and the place of Brierly’s suicide.  Another excellent account is by Sherry, 
Norman `The Pilgrim Ship Episode` reprinted in (1996) Joseph Conrad Lord Jim London: W.W. Norton & Company 
at pp. 319-358. 
35
 Allen, Jerry (1965) The Sea Years of Joseph Conrad at p. 148.  
36
 van Marle, Hans and Lefranc, Pierre `Ashore and Afloat: New Perspectives on Topography and Geography in Lord 
Jim` (1988) Conradiana vol. 20 no. 2 p. 109 at p. 112.  
37
 See Wolstenholme, Philip `We are trusted: Conrad and the Blue Star Line Crosbie Smith` (2004) The Conradian 
vol. 29 at p. 39.  
38
 Zdzislaw, Najder (1983) Joseph Conrad A Chronicle at p. 76. 
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came alongside in answer to distress signals and took the Palestine in tow. But the fire rapidly increased 
and the tow rope was slipped. All hands got into the three boats.  Conrad was in charge of one of the 
boats with three seafarers in it.  The boats remained by the vessel until 8.30 am on 15 March, when she 
was a mass of fire.  On 15 March, the boats arrived at Mintok and the master reported the casualty to the 
harbour master.  After six days, Conrad and the crew were taken to Singapore on the SS Sissie, arriving 
on 22 March.39 Conrad and the other officers surrendered their certificates of competency to the 
authorities at Singapore.  Conrad appeared before the Court on 2 April,40 which delivered its judgment on 
3 April.  It found that there were two ventilators fitted in the vessel; that the main hatch cover was 
frequently taken off during the voyage; that the coal had been loaded on board in a dry state; that no 
thermometers had been provided for testing the temperature in the hold; and that the fire was caused by 
spontaneous combustion.  Despite the absence of thermometers which the captain ought to have ensured 
were provided, the Court held that ‘the officers and crew appear to have done all in their power to subdue 
it, but, with limited means at their disposal, without success.’41  And, since the Palestine was held not to 
have been abandoned prematurely, the certificates of competency were returned, and Conrad could 
continue to sail.    
Conrad’s second appearance before a Court of Inquiry arose in respect of the Riverside. When the 
Court inquired into the loss of the Riversdale, Conrad must have appreciated his good fortune not to have 
been subpoenaed, since the commander of the vessel, Captain McDonald, directly implicated Conrad. On 
10 September 1883, Conrad signed on as second mate,42 but he was discharged at Madras by McDonald 
for making a statement to Dr Thompson, a District Surgeon at Madras, who was called out on the night of 
9 April to attend to the captain. The statement that McDonald was suffering from drink was not 
volunteered by Conrad, but elicited in answers to questions (apparently innocuous but legally 
interrogative), by Dr Thompson.43 The doctor however did not find the captain suffering from delirium 
tremens. And, on 12 April, Conrad wrote to McDonald, confessing that `he found on consideration that 
the statements made to Dr Thompson were not borne out by facts within his personal knowledge and he 
withdraws them and declares them baseless.`  He apologised, adding that ‘there was never any intention 
to cast even the shadow of a doubt of a suspicion on Captain McDonald’s personal or professional 
character.’44 The wording of the letter and third party reference to the captain suggests that the letter may 
have been written on legal advice.  On 15 April, Conrad was discharged by McDonald, which proved to 
be fortunate for Conrad. On 8 April, the Riversdale ventured from Madras bound for Vizagapatam.  On 
29 April, the ship stranded off Point Divi.  Under s. 7 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act 1883, a Court 
of Inquiry was convened at Madras. The Chief Presidency Magistrate presided over the inquiry, assisted 
by two assessors, indicating again that the cancellation of certificates must have been foreseen as a 
possibility.  McDonald deposed to an affidavit in which he alleged:   
 
I twice logged the second mate for sleeping on watch in Madras.  I produce a letter I 
received from the second officer, `Conrad Korzeniowski.`  I never read entries in a log 
to a man unless he cannot read himself. Had a proper watch been kept on board, the 
ship would not have gone ashore.  The lead was not properly attended to.  I could hear 
the breakers distinctly when I came on deck.45   
 
No explicit response to the allegation is in the record.  The Court was probably of the view that, since 
Conrad had been discharged prior to the stranding, no blame could be attributed to him as responsibility 
for the watch and the lead would have passed to the first mate. The Court may also have regarded 
McDonald’s allegations as self-serving and exculpatory; made in retaliation for Conrad’s statement to Dr 
Thompson; and without corroboration.  At the trial, the first mate testified that the captain was 
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 Report of the Marine Court of Inquiry held at the Police Court in Singapore 2 April 1883.  See also Zdzislaw, 
Najder (1983) Joseph Conrad A Chronicle at pp. 76-77; and Karl, Frederick R. (1979) Joseph Conrad: The Three 
Lives at p. 211.  
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intemperate throughout the voyage; the sail maker witnessed the intoxication of the captain on 29 April; 
and the quartermaster testified that the captain had not been sober on 29 April and had staggered about on 
deck.46  But no witness testified to seeing the captain incapable or incompetent to command his ship,47 
and since Dr Thompson stated that the symptoms he had observed might have been attributable to 
sunstroke,48 the Court found insufficient evidence adverse to the sobriety of McDonald.  What the Court 
did find was that, `Either he [the captain] did not know where he was going, in which case there was 
culpable recklessness; or, he did not know where he was, in which case there was equally culpable 
negligence or ignorance.`49 His certificate of competency was suspended for twelve months. In casting the 
lead and performing the soundings, the chief mate was held to have contributed to the casualty. But 
leniency was requested by the assessors,50 and his certificate was suspended for three months. Had 
Conrad not been discharged, it seems that he would have faced the risk of a similar suspension. He was 
also fortunate in that the Court was forced, for lack of government lawyers, into the invidious (and 
irregular) task of acting as both prosecutors and judges;51 and a court accustomed to adversarial 
proceedings, is naturally cautious, even hesitant, in pursuing prosecutions.  Government lawyers, on the 
other hand, would probably have been more aggressive prosecutors and on the basis of McDonald’s 
affidavit may well have taken the view that Conrad should have been put to his defence. Alternatively, the 
prosecutors may have used Conrad’s statement to Dr Thompson to charge McDonald with drunkenness, 
calling Conrad as a witness, seeking independent corroboration of his statement, and thereby negating 
Conrad’s withdrawal of his statement. Either way, Conrad may have found himself before the Court and 
in the witness box, standing uncomfortably exposed to cross-examination.  So, given Conrad’s interest, 
knowledge and close experience of Inquiries, how are the suspended certificates in the Jeddah and the 
Riversdale to be reconciled, if at all, with the cancellation of Jim’s certificate?  
8. Cancellation or Suspension ?  
Jim’s jump from the Patna, according to the established view, was disgraceful; wrong in morality and 
law; and therefore cancellation of his certificate was morally and legally fully justified; but the 
justification is open to challenge.  Marlow, emphasising the inherent limitations of the law, says that the 
issue was `beyond the competency of a court of inquiry: it was a subtle and momentous quarrel as to the 
true essence of life, and did not want a judge.` (p. 43)  But the Court52 had to do the best it could with the 
legally admissible facts, drawing inferences and determining probabilities, even though the `language of 
facts`, as Marlow observes, `are so often more enigmatic than the craftiest arrangement of words.` (p. 
154)  What is more, not every fact, every consideration (whether admissible or not), was before the Court: 
there `were things,` observes Marlow, that Jim `could not explain to the court.`  Since the reader knows 
more about Jim’s thoughts, acts and omissions aboard the Patna than may be inferred from the sparse and 
enigmatic facts before the Court, care has to be exercised in any legal criticism of the judgment.  As 
Marlow observes, the Court,   
 
was beating futilely round the well-known fact, and the play of questions upon it was as 
instructive as the tapping with a hammer on an iron box, were the object to find out 
what's inside. However, an official inquiry could not be any other thing. Its object was 
not the fundamental why, but the superficial how, of this affair (p. 26).  
 
The legally admissible facts before the Court, derived from the testimony of Jim and the helmsman, 
although difficult to assemble, would have been something as follows. The Patna was owned by a 
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Chinaman, chartered by an Arab, and commanded by a German. She carried more or less eight hundred 
pilgrims.  The Patna collided with something afloat.  Jim, the chief mate, was ordered by the captain to 
go forward and ascertain if there was any damage done.  He saw that the forepeak was more than half full 
of water and thought that there must be a big hole below the water-line. The second engineer thought that 
the bulkhead would give way in a minute, and that the vessel would immediately sink. All the officers, 
including Jim, believed that the vessel would sink very fast at any moment. There were seven life-boats 
aboard the Patna, which were enough for about half the passengers. There were four life-boats on one 
side of the bridge and three life-boats on the other side. To Jim it was clear that there was no time to save 
the passengers; nonetheless he tried to cut the life-boats clear of the Patna for the use of the passengers, 
and decided not to join the other officers in releasing a boat and abandoning the ship.  But later, when a 
squall hit the Patna and the men in the life-boat were calling out for George to jump, Jim jumped into the 
life-boat. At no stage was anything done by any officer, other than Jim, to attempt to secure the safety of 
the passengers.  But the Patna did not sink and all the passengers and crew survived. 
How might another court have judged these facts? The abandonment of a vessel is a matter of fact,53 
judged in relation to its own particular facts.  In the MFV Meob Bay,54 the Court rejected the notion of the 
`normal practice` of abandonment.  Instead, it held that: 
 
to judge the abandonment of the vessel against the normal practice is not … to pay 
adequate regard to the particular circumstances of each case.  The circumstances of 
each abandonment can differ widely: the Titanic …  sank within a matter of hours, but 
the MFV Meob Bay … sank within a matter of minutes.  To judge the abandonment of 
the MFV Meob Bay by the standards of the abandonment of the Titanic is … wrong.  It 
is not surprising that other courts have considered questions of abandonment in 
accordance with the circumstances of the case. 55 
 
Although there can be no definition of a normal abandonment, the master would, almost invariably, 
need to remain on board for the purpose of discharging the captain’s duties and not for the romantic 
notion of going down with the ship, dying a heroic death, as landlubbers expect of seafarers. Duty does 
not, as a matter of law (putting aside questions of honour), include suicide.56  In The Magnolia,57 Willmer 
J put it thus: 
 
If one man had to remain on board … that man must be the skipper himself. … It must 
be remembered that, as skipper, he was in honour bound to remain on board his ship 
and do what he could to bring her to safety, so long as his remaining on board could 
achieve any useful purpose at all. … it is to be said that it was his duty, as skipper, to 
remain on board his ship until the last safe moment. 
 
So, the master must stay on board until the last safe moment; and is under a double duty, not only to 
take all possible and necessary steps to save his crew, but also to save his ship.58 To these ends, the master 
must resist and quell panic, exercise self-control, and calmly exercise judgment in an emergency, giving 
orders and dispelling panic among the passengers and crew,59 until the arrival of the last safe moment, 
when the vessel may be abandoned. In the MV Ovalau II60 the passengers were taken off the doomed ship 
in two separate stages.  Only after the passengers were evacuated, did the master and crew abandon the 
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 The Albionic [1942] 72 Ll. L. Rep. 91 at 95 where Lord Greene MR said, within the context of a claim for salvage, 
that: ‘Whether or not there has been an abandonment in fact must depend on the facts of each individual case’.  See 
also The Ilona [1923] Ll. L. Rep.   569. 
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 Report of the Court of Marine Enquiry in Namibia in the Matter of the MFV Meob Bay (17 January 2005). 
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 Report of the Court of Marine Enquiry in Namibia in the Matter of the MFV Meob Bay (17 January 2005). 
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vessel. In the MFV Meob Bay,61 which sank with heavy loss of life, it was alleged that the abandonment 
was driven by panic, since the crew grabbed at life jackets, while others jumped overboard. But, given 
that it must have been obvious that the vessel was about to sink at any moment, the Court held that: 
 
a degree of terror would not have been an unnatural reaction in a crew member … there 
is a difference between terror and irrational actions driven by panic ...  The force of the 
water was all around the crew, who had to hold onto the steel work and move across the 
deck on their hands and knees.  … To grab at a life jacket in these circumstances was 
… perfectly natural and not indicative of panic. … For some of the crew to have 
jumped into the water before the release of a life raft when it was dangerous to stay on 
board and when attempts to release the life rafts had proved to be unsuccessful was not 
… improper.  When the Court has regard to the heavy heaving swells, the force of the 
wind and the waves, the heavy list of the vessel, and the fact that the doomed vessel 
was only about two and a half minutes away from its fate, it is clear … that the Skipper 
and crew conducted a proper abandonment of the vessel and took every reasonable step 
that could have been expected. 62  
 
Applying the law to the captain of the Patna, the cancellation of his certificate is unimpeachable: 
without self-control, overwhelmed by panic, oblivious of his double duty, he deserted his vessel without 
attempting any judgment as to the last safe moment, a moment that never arrived.     
When the captain deserted, the double duty to save life and the ship would have fallen on Jim. After 
discovering the ingress of water, he decided that, `There was nothing to do but to sink with the ship. No 
use making a disturbance about it. Was there? He waited upstanding, without a sound, stiffened in the 
idea of some sort of heroic discretion.` But then he jumped. The jump, described by Marlow as 
‘impulsive’ and `unreflecting,` has been analysed as an `instinctive reflex, an unconscious physical 
reaction to danger and death` which `disrupts the direct causal relationship between Jim’s psyche and 
body, but that neither Jim nor Marlow entirely dismiss the jump.`63 A mere error of judgment (exercised 
calmly in the course of duty in deciding between two courses) committed in a moment of great peril 
would have been a good defence;64 but Jim committed no error of judgment; there was no judgment, 
merely an unconscious reaction in which judgment was subsumed by panic.  Jim’s failure was to panic 
for an instant in a moment of terror. And, as was held in Brown v Board of Trade,65 `here the fault is no 
error of judgment, but a failure … to exercise … judgment at all, a surrender of … judgment to the 
influence of an unreasonable panic.` In defence of himself, Jim explained to Marlow,   
 
I know very well--I jumped … but I tell you they were too much for any man. It was 
their doing as plainly as if they had reached up with a boat-hook and pulled me over. 
Can't you see it? You must see it (p. 57). 
 
This is no legal defence. The crew in the boat called for George not for Jim; but assuming they called 
Jim and beckoned him to jump, Jim’s explanation, being based on obedience to orders, could not have 
been portrayed as a mere error of judgment between competing, and balanced, alternatives. This was a 
simple dereliction of duty - too clear and too gross - to admit of such a construction; and that 
consideration, together with Jim’s attempt to shift the blame to others, further qualifies our sympathy for 
Jim.66 But was the penalty of cancellation fair?     
There are extenuating factors, of variable weight, which distinguish Jim from his captain. Jim did try 
to cut lose the life-boats for the passengers and, in deciding to stay with the passengers and ship, he had 
attempted to quell his panic. Jim was not yet 24 years old. Youthfulness, it has been held, may require the 
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suspension of a certificate for a specified period of the certificate.67 Of those who abandoned the Patna, 
Jim was the only one `willing to face` (p. 26) the Court of Inquiry. `The rest,` as Jim said, `got out of it in 
one way or another.` (p. 36) But Jim took himself to Court, where he answered all the questions: `he 
remembered everything. He wanted to go on talking for truth's sake, perhaps for his own sake also.` 
(p.15) He was not evasive and he co-operated fully with the inquiry, even though, as Marlow says, `the 
inquiry was a severe punishment to Jim, and that his facing it – practically of his own free will – was a 
redeeming feature in his abominable case.` (p.32) The remorse that Jim showed, the shame that he 
suffered, as he was pilloried in public, was obvious to Brierly and must have been clear to the other 
members of the Court. For these reasons, rehabilitation, rather than punishment, should have been 
achieved by the suspension of the certificate for, say, two years, coupled with training68 in abandonment 
drills.  As a matter of the fair application of the law, this would have balanced the right of the public to 
safe ships and given Jim the opportunity to return to sea service, allowing him a chance of seeking and 
finding redemption at sea.  That is not of course to suggest that such an application of the law would in 
itself have quelled Jim’s own intense sense shame; that would remain a private struggle for Jim.    
That Conrad had the Court punish Jim with the cancellation of his certificate -  in contrast with the 
penalties in the Jeddah and the Riversdale and other cases69 - for momentary panic, instantly regretted, 
should be regarded as unfairly harsh. This evokes sympathy for Jim and impugns the enforcement of the 
law as unfair. Marlow observes that, `The real significance of crime is in its being a breach of faith with 
the community of mankind, and from that point of view he [Jim] was no mean traitor, but his execution 
was a hole-and-corner affair` (p. 72).  As Conrad would have known from his understanding of the law, 
another Court would most probably not have cancelled, but suspended, Jim’s certificate.  
The proceedings in the Patna were, in any event, fatally irregular due to the interventions of Captain 
Brierly (who was based on an actual person).70 As a self-appointed representative of the honour of the 
merchant marine,71 he holds `silent inquiry into his own case` (p. 27) and leaps into the sea. Although his 
suicide is of course no ground for setting aside the judgment, Brierly had already crossed a legal line 
when - during the course of the Inquiry - he asked Marlow,  
 
‘Why are we tormenting that young chap?’ … Can't he see that wretched skipper of his 
has cleared out? What does he expect to happen? Nothing can save him. He's done for.’  
… It costs some money to run away. ‘Does it? Not always,’ he said, with a bitter laugh, 
and to some further remark of mine—‘Well, then, let him creep twenty feet 
underground and stay there! By heavens! I would.’  I tell you what, I will put up two 
hundred rupees if you put up another hundred and undertake to make the beggar clear 
out early to-morrow morning. … ‘I'll give you two hundred rupees now, Marlow, and 
you just talk to that chap … I can't do it myself--but you … Of course I declined to 
meddle. The tone of this last ‘but you’ (poor Brierly couldn't help it), that seemed to 
imply I was no more noticeable than an insect, caused me to look at the proposal with 
indignation (p. 31).  
 
Passing judgment before hearing all the evidence; attempting to persuade Marlow to talk Jim into 
fleeing the Court;72 trying by bribery to obstruct the proceedings which, by virtue of his appointment, he 
was obliged to uphold, were, legally speaking, grossly improper; even though enacted out of some 
misguided notion of honourable conduct. In an actual Court, such a nautical assessor would be removed; 
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and if the assessor had influenced the proceedings as a whole, the inquiry would start de nova with fresh 
members.  But, smitten by shame,73 and unaware of the irregularity, Jim does not appeal the cancellation 
of his certificate.    
 
9. Imaginative Precision of “Inquiry”  
It is the extended inquiries - in and out of Court - that gives Jim his significance, not the answers. Lord 
Jim `gives no answers, take no sides;`74 it is a novel that `resists a single meaning;` changing with each 
reading,75 it is a `structure of mutually competing coherences`76 with a `multiplicity of possible 
incompatible explanations.`77 So, the imaginative precision of `inquiry,` with its association of 
proliferating questions, is an apt analogical equivalent.  Jim is viewed from multiple inquiring 
perspectives78 as the inquiry extends from the Patna to Patusan. Otherwise, Jim would have vanished 
without curiosity, for as Marlow observes of him, `I had seen better men go out, disappear, vanish utterly, 
without provoking a sound of curiosity or sorrow.` (p. 102)   
Lord Jim, in laying bare the inherent limitations of the Court of Inquiry, reveals the additional need 
for, and effect of, a multiplicity of different inquiries, yielding greater insights into Jim, all of which 
either severally or jointly remain incomplete. Of the inquiries, the closest is conducted by Marlow, who is 
caught up by it, baffled by it and ultimately `matured` by it.79 Although a friend,80 Marlow he never acts 
as Jim’s confessor, giving him redemption,81 but judges him variously.  The multiple - and competing - 
inquiries into Jim persist until his equivocal and enigmatic end, and then remain unresolved, so that  
`technical language`  becomes, as Conrad would have wanted, the language of `imaginative precision`.   
10.  Suspension in Camera  
Jims’ own sense of shame springs indelibly into existence the moment he jumps from the Patna. But it is 
in the Court that he is shamed publically, his failure being minutely dissected under the public gaze and 
the reasons for the cancellation of his certificate being detailed. That punishment destroys his reputation 
wherever the news of it spreads. `These proceedings`, as Marlow observes, `had all the cold vengefulness 
of a death-sentence, and the cruelty of a sentence of exile.` (p. 73)  And, as Brierly exclaims, `let him 
[Jim] creep twenty feet underground and stay there!` (p. 91)  
A Court would, as a matter of public policy, have intended the cancellation of any seafarer’s 
certificate to serve as a warning to others. Jim’s Prometheus-like suffering is disproportionate to his 
momentary failure. His intense sense of shame82 at his failure to live up to his own heroic ego-ideal and 
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his public acceptance of punishment83 enhances our sympathy (although qualified) for his self-imposed 
plight and pity at his death, especially since he tries his utmost (whether or not we agree with his actions), 
to atone for his failure and to redeem himself.84 Jim’s public excoriation and public shaming as part of the 
legal process, seems excessive; and this raises the prospect that a Court, in balancing deterrence, 
punishment, rehabilitation, and public and private interests should, in exceptional circumstances, have the 
power to impose its penalties anonymously.  But this would require law reform.  Conrad’s appearance 
before the committee on safe manning suggests his commitment in principle to reform. His view that the 
world is neither just nor unjust, that the cosmos is godless and indifferent, would not, it is suggested, have 
rendered legal reform meaningless to Conrad.  So, while an argument arises for the striking of Jim’s name 
(and others like him) from the record; for the master of the Patna and the other officers the greater the 
public shame the greater the warning for other such seafarers.    
11.  Lord Jim and  Law Reform  
Today many marine casualty investigations are conducted under the International Standards and 
Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (the Code), 
which was done under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization, a specialised agency of 
the United Nations.  On 1 January 2010, Part II of the Code became mandatory for states parties to the 
Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974 (SOLAS 1974).85 Part III is recommendatory.  There are 159 states 
parties to SOLAS 1974.  The ships flying the flags of these states comprise 99.04% of the tonnage of the 
world’s fleet.86  The Code is of crucial importance to the investigation of loss of life and property at sea, 
aiming to achieve fair procedures resulting in reliable lessons for the prevention, as far as possible, of the 
loss of life and property at sea.   
If a state is a party to SOLAS 1974 and bound under that Convention to give full and complete effect 
to the Code, the legal drafter tasked with the domestic enactment of the Code may, it is argued, gain 
guidance from Lord Jim.  Here, Jim and his captain may be regarded as representative of types 
imaginatively facing investigation pursuant to the Code. In this context, the novel speaks to the difficult 
choice of options confronting the legal drafter.    
Consider the options. Should only the mandatory provisions of Part II of the Code be enacted; or 
should the recommendatory provisions in Part III be additionally enacted? When Jim brought himself 
before the court, he earned our sympathy, even some respect. But his captain ‘departed, disappeared, 
vanished, absconded’ (at page 22) and the other officers were also fugitives from justice.  For safety 
lessons to be learned from a casualty investigation under the Code, it is crucial that all seafarers cooperate 
fully and frankly.  Fearing criminal prosecution and/or other legal liability, a minority of seafarers may 
cooperate; but the majority would not, it is suggested, voluntarily bring themselves before casualty 
investigators. So, how could a legal drafter giving domestic effect to SOLAS 1974 and the Code attempt 
to secure the cooperation of fugitive seafarers?   
The best hope of cooperation is the guarantee of a no-blame and confidential investigation so that no 
confession, self-incriminating statement, or any adverse admission would be admissible in any parallel or 
subsequent criminal, civil, administrative, or disciplinary proceeding.  While the promise of such a non-
blame and confidential investigation appears to be reasonably assured in Part II of the Code, the text of 
Part III is deeply indeterminate.  In Part II, chapter 12.2 it is stipulated that: 
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All seafarers from whom evidence is sought shall be informed of the nature and basis of 
the marine safety investigation. Further, a seafarer from whom evidence is sought shall 
be informed, and allowed access to legal advice, regarding: .1 any potential risk that 
they may incriminate themselves in any proceedings subsequent to the marine safety 
investigation; .2 any right not to self-incriminate or to remain silent; .3 any protections 
afforded to the seafarer to prevent the evidence being used against them if they provide 
the evidence to the marine safety investigation. 
 
Is the risk of legal liability excluded?  In the second sentence, the phrase ‘shall be informed’ is 
mandatory, admitting of no exceptions so that a failure or refusal to  inform the seafarer of the ‘risk,’ 
‘right’ and ‘protections’ would, if the seafarer has suffered prejudice, render the legal proceedings a 
nullity.  A right to be informed is thus created by chapter 12.2, which a state party is obliged to enact 
domestically.  But the right is limited to ‘any proceedings subsequent’ to the investigation, since the right 
would not by implication cover parallel legal proceedings. Furthermore, no right not to self-incriminate 
or to remain silent is created, since reference to that right is prefaced by the word ‘any,’ implying that the 
seafarer must be informed of that right but only if the right already exists (the same argument would, it is 
argued, apply to ‘any protections’).   The word ‘any’ is thus to be read as meaning ‘if any.’  If no such 
right or protection already exists, the right to be informed about a non-existent right or protection would 
be pointless; but since such a right or protection is enshrined in human rights conventions,87 binding on 
many states, it should already exist in the law of many states.  But the right to be informed does not 
explicitly relate to civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings. So, in summary, the mandatory 
provisions of chapter 12.2 should reasonably assure - but not guarantee - that no self-incriminating 
disclosure is admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings. However, a seafarer who makes a self-
incriminating disclosure would be at risk of the disclosure being admissible in parallel criminal 
proceedings and in parallel and subsequent civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings.  It is 
therefore doubtful that chapter 12.2 would, apart from Jim, ensure the cooperation of the other officers of 
the Patna. Conversely, the enactment of chapter 23.1 of Part III would virtually ensure their non-
cooperation.  Chapter 23.1 provides that: 
 
States should ensure that investigator(s) carrying out a marine safety investigation only 
disclose information from a marine safety record where: .1 it is necessary or desirable 
to do so for transport safety purposes and any impact on the future availability of safety 
information to a marine safety investigation is taken into account; or .2 as otherwise 
permitted in accordance with this Code,   
 
and Chapter 23.2 states that: 
 
States involved in marine safety investigation under this Code should ensure that any 
marine safety record in its possession is not disclosed in criminal, civil, disciplinary or 
administrative proceedings unless: .1 the appropriate authority for the administration of 
justice in the State determines that any adverse domestic or international impact that the 
disclosure of the information might have on any current or future marine safety 
investigations is outweighed by the public interest in the administration of justice; and 
.2 where appropriate in the circumstances, the State which provided the marine safety 
record to the marine safety investigation authorizes its disclosure. 
 
Here are no peremptory strictures against the admissibility of self-incriminating disclosures made in 
an investigation; ‘should’ not ‘shall’ being employed throughout Chapters 23.1 and 23.2.  On the 
contrary, information is admissible, for example, if the information is ‘necessary or desirable,’ or in ‘the 
public interest in the administration of justice’ or where ‘appropriate in the circumstances.’  Since the 
meanings of these loosely textured terms will often be a matter for argument in court, there can be no 
                                                 
87
 See, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;87 the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners; and the European Convention on Human Rights.    
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guarantee of confidentiality: full and frank co-operation with an investigating officer might nonetheless 
result in self-incriminating evidence being admissible in separate criminal, civil, disciplinary or 
administrative proceedings against seafarers.  Lord Jim strongly suggests that Chapters 23.1 and 23.2 of 
Part III should not be enacted into national statues. 
12. Literary and Legal Interpretation  
How should enactments of SOLAS 1974 and the Code be interpreted? And can literary interpretation 
assist in legal interpretation?  Professor Dworkin contends that ‘we can improve our understanding of law 
by comparing legal interpretation with interpretation in other fields of knowledge, particularly law.’88 It 
will be argued that this contested view,89 although correct in principle, requires considerable qualification 
given the unique characteristics of SOLAS 1974 and the Code.    
Statues enacting SOLAS 1974 have their historical genesis in the recommendations of the Court of 
Inquiry90 into the loss of the Titanic handed down in 1912. Many of those recommendations were 
enshrined in the first International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 20 January 1914,91  the 
progenitor of SOLAS 1974.92 All 159 state parties to SOLAS 1974 and the Code are obliged under 
international law ‘to promulgate all laws, decrees, orders and regulations and to take all other steps which 
may be necessary to give the present Convention full and complete effect;’93 the implication being that a 
state may legislate for safety standards higher but not lower than those stipulated in the convention, so 
that the legislative discretion of states is fettered in a manner that is not applicable to other national 
statutes. What is more, the enactment of SOLAS 1974 must be deposited with the IMO,94 which is 
another unique characteristic.   
Flag States and substantially interested states95 are under an international obligation96 to investigate 
and report on very serious casualties to achieve an increased level of safety, improved marine 
environment protection, and a reduction in loss of life at sea.  Under SOLAS 197497 each state party 
undertakes to conduct a casualty investigation ‘when it judges that such an investigation may assist in 
determining what changes to the present regulations may be desirable’ but that ‘no reports … shall 
disclose the identity or nationality of the ships concerned or in any manner fix or imply responsibility 
upon any ship or person.’ The Code also stipulates that each flag state has a duty to conduct an 
investigation into any casualty occurring to any of its ships ‘when it judges that such an investigation may 
                                                 
88
 Ronald Dworkin ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) Texas Law Review p. 527.  
89
 Judge Posner, for example, contends that the ‘functions of legislation and law are so different, and the objectives of 
the readers of these two different sorts of mental product so divergent, that the principles and approaches developed 
so far for the one have no useful application to the other:’ Richard A. Posner ‘Law and Literature: A Relation 
Reargued’ (1986) 72 Texas Law Review 1351 at p. 1374. 
90
 The Court of Inquiry was presided over by Lord Mersey. He handed down his judgment on 30 July 1912, which 
also contained recommendations.  Recommendation 24 provided: ‘That (unless already done) steps should be taken 
to call an International Conference to consider and as far as possible to agree upon a common line of conduct in 
respect of (a) the sub-division of ships; (b) the provision and working of life-saving appliances; (c) the installation of 
wireless telegraphy and the method of working the same; (d) the reduction of speed or the alteration of course in the 
vicinity of ice, and (e) the use of searchlights.’ 
91
 There was at the time some opposition to the USA and the UK becoming parties to SOLAS 1914 see, for example, 
Andrew Furuseth (the President of the Seamen’s Union) Safety of Life at Sea Analysis and Explanatory Notes of the 
London Convention on Safety of Life in relation to the American Merchant Marine (1914) and Hansard 7 October 
1912 vol. 42 cc 32-148 respectively.  The opposition was unsuccessful.  On 25/05/1980, SOLAS 1975 entered  into 
force at the international level for the USA and the UK.  
92
 SOLAS 1914 was followed by SOLAS 1929, SOLAS 1948, SOLAS 1960 and SOLAS 1974.  The authentic text of 
SOLAS 1974, updated and consolidated, is available for purchase from the IMO.    
93
 Article I(b) of  SOLAS 1974. 
94
 Article III(a) of SOLAS 1974. 
95
 The IMO encourages co-operation and recognition of mutual interest through a number of resolutions: 
A.173(ES.IV); A.322(IX); A.440(XI); A.442(XI) and A.637(16).   
96
 See, for example, MARPOL articles 8 and 12; the Load Lines Convention article 23; and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea article 94(7).  the need to encourage flag States and substantially interested States 
to meet their international obligation to investigate and report on very serious casualties so as to bring about an 
increased level of safety, improve protection for the marine environment and to reduce the number of deaths at sea, as 
well as document MSC 92/INF.8 (INTERCARGO) relating to casualties involving bulk carriers. 
12.21 The Committee further instructed 
97
 See regulation I/21 and XI-1/6 of SOLAS 1974. 
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assist in determining what changes in the present regulations may be desirable.’ The casualty reports 
reported to the IMO98 are subjected to a comprehensive system of analysis.99  Amendment of a 
convention is normally a long and protracted process but the tacit amendment procedure100 provides that, 
unless there are a specified number of objections, an amendment of SOLAS 1974 will enter into force at a 
particular date. So amendment is greatly expedited; and keeping the Convention abreast of international 
developments is the shared responsibility of the community of maritime states.  Also of significance is the 
worldwide enforcement of SOLAS 1974 and the Code by means of the principle of ‘no more favourable 
treatment’ so that ships flying the flags of states that have decided not to become contracting parties to 
the Convention are nonetheless subjected to the requirements of SOLAS 1974 in the ports of states 
parties, unless the ship was forced to deviate to that port from her intended voyage ‘due to stress of 
weather or any other cause of force majeure.’101 Taken as a whole these unique characteristics of SOLAS 
1974 suggest a specific approach to the interpretation of statutes giving domestic effect to the 
Convention.   
For Dworkin the right interpretation of any statute requires the construction of ‘a scheme of abstract 
and concrete principles that provides a coherent justification for all common law precedents and, so far as 
these are to be justified on principle, constitutional and statutory provisions as well.’102 This, he famously 
argues, requires the superhuman power of Justice Hercules (based on the classical mythological hero), 
who with complete mastery of all these legal materials finds but does not fabricate the one right answer to 
any question of law.  And, just as literature is to be interpreted aesthetically as the best possible work of 
art, so says Dworkin should statutes similarly be interpreted to provide the best constructive interpretation 
of political morality.103 But this theory (assuming its validity in common law systems), would not find 
general acceptance within the interpretive community of 170 states at the IMO.  Limited by its common 
law paradigm, it would be rejected, as lacking universal applicability, even leading to domination by 
common law systems and to the hermeneutics of hegemony. In common law systems when judges decide 
new cases, it is as if, says Dworkin, they are acting as chain novelists, in a  
 
‘complex chain enterprise of which innumerable decisions, structures, conventions, and 
practices are the history, it is his job to continue that history into the future through 
what he does on the day. He must interpret what have gone before because he has a 
responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new 
direction of his own.’104   
 
But in non-common law systems, with no principle of stare decisis and with judges proceeding 
inquisitorially,105 this approach would not fit, resulting in a shambles.  For enactments of SOLAS 1974 
and the Code, interpretation is a reiterative process of discourse at the interpretive community of the 
IMO: interpretations are constantly reviewed and unified, definitions are deleted or added, and 
amendments are agreed.  This is a never ending process of enhancing textual determinacy. And, since all 
interpretations are ultimately approved only by the interpretive community of the IMO, no interpretative 
approach should reference materials or considerations that lie outside the contemplation of the IMO. Such 
an approach could, it is submitted, be achieved by the following interpretation provision:  
 
                                                 
98
 Reporting to IMO of marine safety investigations and marine casualties and incidents are based on the following 
IMO instruments: MSC.255(84)), paragraph 14.1, chapter 14 of the mandatory Part II; resolution A.646(16), 
paragraph 3; MSC/Circ.539/Add.2, paragraph 2; MSC/Circ.753, paragraph 3; MSC/Circ.802, paragraph 3; MSC-
MEPC.7/Circ.7, paragraph 4; and MSC- MEPC.3/Circ.3, paragraphs 6 and 8. 
99
 The Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (‘FSI’), has a Correspondence Group and a Working Group on 
Casualty Analysis involved in the process of analysing reports of investigations into casualties received by the IMO. 
The recommendations of the Correspondence and Working Groups are approved by the FSI Sub-Committee and 
forwarded to other IMO bodies.  
100
 See article VIII of SOLAS 1974. 
101
 Article IV of SOLAS 1974. 
102
 Ronald Dworkin A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press) 1985 at pp. 116-117. 
103
 Ronald Dworkin ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) Texas Law Review p. 527 at p. 531. 
104
 Ronald Dworkin A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press) 1985 at pp. 159.    
105
 See, for example, Vincy Fon and Franceso Parisi ‘Judicial precedents in civil law systems: A dynamic analysis’ 
(2006) 26(4) International Review of Law and Economics 519. 
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Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, a court of law or any 
tribunal or any investigating officer may, in the interpretation of SOLAS 1974 and the 
Code, consider (a): the travaux préparatoires of SOLAS 1974 and the Code; (b) the 
official records of interventions made by states, inter-government organizations, and 
non-governmental organization in consultative status at the IMO (including the 
recorded verbal interventions); and (c) the different official language versions106 of 
SOLAS 1974 and the Code.107  
 
The opening clause would preclude Herculean and other such approaches that would otherwise reach 
for materials or considerations that would never have been within the contemplation of the IMO.  
Reference could however be made to the materials specified in (a) to (c), but the need for such a reference 
should be infrequent, given the large number of unified interpretations and definitions that are being 
constantly developed at the IMO and by international non-governmental organizations108 to ensure that 
texts are  clear, unambiguous, and easily applicable.  
Although SOLAS 1974 concerns matters of life and death at sea, judges seldom interpret its terms.  
Instead, there is a multitude of non-judges, even non-lawyers, charged with the responsibility of 
interpreting and enforcing SOLAS 1974 and the Code. The practice is for master mariners (trained and 
certificated to the same international standards under the international convention)109 to investigate 
casualties; peer judgment and sea-going experience trumping legal learning and courtroom experience in 
the determination of casualty causes.  For seafarers no peer judgment is to be had from the superhuman 
and omniscient Justice Hercules. Perhaps Conrad’s answer to Justice Hercules would be Captain 
MacWhirr, master of the Nan-Shan, depicted with masterful irony and ambivalence in Typhoon.  Being 
the intellectual antithesis to Justice Hercules, the unimaginative mind of Captain MacWhirr ‘had no 
pronounced characteristics whatever; it was simply ordinary, irresponsive, and unruffled;’ (p. 133) 
considered a ‘little pityingly’ as if ‘half-witted’ by his father, (p. 135) he was the object of some ridicule 
by the highly imaginative and articulate young mate Jakes. Yet here is a master who, being without 
political prejudice, accepts with equal equanimity the Siamese flag and British ensign; was ‘not in the 
least conceited;’ (p. 134) who commanded every ship with ‘harmony and peace;’ (p. 134) and who had a 
reputation as a ‘reliable skipper.’ (p. 136)  Under the ‘burden’ and ‘loneliness of command’ (p. 163), it is 
the ‘frail,’ ‘indomitable’ (p. 167) and ‘resisting’ (p. 170) words and physical presence of Captain 
MacWhirr to which Jakes clings in his terror of the typhoon.  Privately believing that his ship ‘could not 
possibly live another hour in such a sea’ (p. 206), Captain MacWhirr orders Jake to attend to the 200 
Chinese aboard the battered vessel with ‘humane intention and a vague sense of the fitness of things,’ (p. 
199) giving them ‘the same chance’ of survival (p. 202) as the crew.  No Court of Inquiry could make any 
finding except to commend Captain MacWhirr as strongly it would condemn the captain of the Patna.   
But Captain MacWhirr is a ‘literal’ man, ‘expostulating ‘against the use of images in speech’ (p. 151), 
angry with a lot of words that provide no ‘glimmer of certitude’ (p. 157). In judging his peers, he would 
interpret the domestic enactments of SOLAS 1974 and the Code unimaginatively and impatiently; but 
also literally (consistently with the many approved definitions and unified interpretations), practically and 
impartially for the multinational seafarers of the world.  And, within the international interpretive 
community of his fellow master mariners at the IMO, the simple words of Captain MacWhirr would find 
more resonance than dissonance.    
                                                 
106
 The official languages of the IMO are English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese, and Russian.  
107
 An approach, similar but different, was taken In the Wreck and Salvage Act 94 of 1996 of South Africa, 
(domestically enacting the 1989 International Salvage Convention), where it is provided in s. 2(5) that: 
‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law or the common law contained, a court of law or any 
tribunal may, in the interpretation of the Convention, consider the preparatory texts to the Convention, decisions of 
foreign courts and any publication.’ The reference to decisions of foreign courts and publication does however 
introduce work for Justice Hercules. 
108
 The International Association of Ship Classification Societies, for instance, has developed 261 definitions and 
unified interpretations of SOLAS 1974.   
109
 Certificates obtained by seafarers pursuant to the STCW Convention are recognised internationally. 
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13. Enduring Value of  Lord Jim  
While one of the greatest complaints against law and literature is that it fails to engage practising 
lawyers,110 the epistemological inquiry in Lord Jim into the inherent limitations of the law is I think of 
value to practising admiralty lawyers.  Conrad’s location of the Court of Inquiry in a larger frame of 
ethical and epistemological reflection does not reject or even discount the law; instead it stimulates the 
reform of the law better calibrated to achieve cooperation between seafarers and casualty investigators, 
the prevention of marine casualties, and justice for seafarers.111   
In A Personal Record, Conrad said, `And what is a novel if not a conviction of our fellow-men’s 
existence strong enough to take upon itself a form of imagined life clearer than reality and whose 
accumulated verisimilitude of selected episodes puts to shame the pride of documentary history` (p. 16).  
In 2005, I presided over a Court of Marine Inquiry in the MFV Meob Bay; and later, on reading Lord Jim, 
I was struck by its `accumulated verisimilitude` in relation to the practice, procedure and public aims of 
contemporary inquiries and investigations into marine casualties.  The novel is a canonical text for law 
and literature and case study for academic and practising admiralty lawyers: illustrating the use and abuse 
of the law and procedures of Courts of Inquiry; exposing violations of the obligations owed by master and 
officers to their passengers; questioning notions of fair punishment; and suggesting drafting options for 
the enactment of legislation encouraging cooperation between seafarers and casualty investigators.  And 
the interpretation of such enactments should be adapted to the characteristics of the enactments, their 
interpreters, and their interpretive community.  When I drafted such enactments for some states, Conrad’s 
work played for me an indirect, discreet and valuable role, influencing the draft legislation and suggesting 
specific approaches to statutory interpretation.   
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